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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
JUSTIN CASE JAY,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45356
ELMORE COUNTY NOS. CR 2016-2463,
CR 2017-384 & CR 2017-542
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury found twenty-eight-year-old Justin Case Jay guilty of two
counts of grand theft by possession of a stolen vehicle, as well as two misdemeanors. The
district court, for each of the grand theft counts, imposed a concurrent unified sentence of seven
years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. On appeal, Mr. Jay asserts the district
court abused its discretion when it imposed the sentences in his case.

1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Early one morning, Mr. Jay parked a vehicle in the Mountain Home City Cemetery. (See
Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.3-4.) He later stated that, at the time, “I was really
stressed out, I had a lot of bills, and I needed dope . . . .” (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Jay reported a friend
had given him the vehicle to drive to Twin Falls so he could help with some work. (PSI, p.4.)
He stated he went by the cemetery to “relieve stress.” (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Jay was thinking about his
girlfriend, the mother of his child, who had passed away in a car accident a few months prior.
(See PSI, pp.4, 14.) Mr. Jay stated, “I felt comfortable there.” (PSI, p.4.)
A Mountain Home Police Department officer saw a vehicle in the cemetery, at an hour
when the cemetery was closed. (See PSI, p.3.) When the officer approached the vehicle, it drove
away and went into an adjacent parking lot. (See PSI, p.3.) The officer followed the vehicle into
the parking lot. (PSI, p.3.) The driver of the vehicle, Mr. Jay, had no driver’s license or
registration, and only had an ID card. (See PSI, p.3.) The officer arrested Mr. Jay for a
suspended license, and found a glass pipe on his person. (See PSI, p.3.) Dispatch informed the
officer the vehicle was confirmed stolen out of Payette County. (PSI, p.3.) Mr. Jay, during the
presentence investigation later, reported he did not know the vehicle was stolen. (PSI, p.4.) The
vehicle contained a large amount of worksite tools. (PSI, p.3.) Additionally, officers found a
financial transaction card belonging to the owner of the vehicle, another financial transaction
card belonging to a second person, and a driver’s license belonging to a third person, inside the
vehicle. (See PSI, pp.4, 119-20.)
In Elmore County No. CR 2016-2463, the State charged Mr. Jay with one count of felony
grand theft by possession of a stolen vehicle, one count of felony possession of a controlled
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substance, and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor.
(R., pp.56-58, 68-69, 110-12.)
In Elmore County No. CR 2017-384, the State charged Mr. Jay with two counts of felony
grand theft by possessing stolen property, relating to the financial transaction cards, as well as
one count of misdemeanor petit theft by possessing stolen property, relating to the driver’s
license. (R., pp.22-23.) At the preliminary hearing, the two counts of grand theft were dismissed
because a witness was unavailable.

(See R., p.28.)

The same day, in Elmore County

No. CR 2017-542, the State charged Mr. Jay with two counts of felony grand theft by possessing
stolen property, again relating to the financial transaction cards. (See R., pp.35-36, 46-47.)
The district court consolidated the three cases. (See R., pp.32-34, 50-51, 94-95.) Mr. Jay
entered a plea of not guilty to all the charges. (See R., pp.28, 75-76.)
At the conclusion of Mr. Jay’s jury trial (see R., pp.156-165), the jury found Mr. Jay not
guilty of grand theft by possessing a stolen vehicle, possession of a controlled substance, and
possession of drug paraphernalia (R., pp.168-69). The jury found Mr. Jay guilty of a lesser
included offense of misdemeanor driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent, both counts of
grand theft by possession of stolen property, and petit theft by possession of stolen property.
(See R., pp.166-68.)
During Mr. Jay’s sentencing hearing, the State recommended the district court impose a
unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed, for the first grand theft by possession of
stolen property count, and a consecutive unified sentence of five years indeterminate for the
second grand theft count.1 (Tr., p.166, Ls.17-23.) Mr. Jay recommended the district court

1

For the driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent count, the State recommended the district
court grant Mr. Jay credit for 258 days served. (Tr., p.165, Ls.15-18.) For the petit theft by
3

consider, for each of the grand theft counts, imposing a unified sentence of five years, with two
years fixed, suspending the sentence, and placing him on probation for a period of five years.2
(Tr., p.168, Ls.7-15.)
For each of the grand theft by possession of stolen property counts, the district court
imposed a concurrent unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed.3 (R., pp.182-86.)
The district court then retained jurisdiction. (R., p.183.)
Mr. Jay filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s judgments. (R., pp.19497.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed concurrent unified sentences of seven
years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Jay following his conviction for two counts of grand theft
by possession of stolen property?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Concurrent Unified Sentence Of
Seven Years, With Three Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Jay Following His Conviction For Two Counts
Of Grand Theft By Possession Of Stolen Property
Mr. Jay asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his concurrent
unified sentences, because the sentences are excessive considering any view of the facts. The
district court should have instead followed Mr. Jay’s recommendation by imposing unified

possession of stolen property count, the State recommended the district court grant Mr. Jay credit
for 140 days served. (Tr., p.166, Ls.12-16.)
2
Mr. Jay agreed with the State’s recommendation of credit for time served on the other counts.
(See Tr., p.168, Ls.4-6.)
3
For the driving a vehicle without the owner’s consent count, the district court imposed a
sentence of 180 days jail time, with credit for 180 days served. (R., pp.187-90.) For the petit
theft by possessing stolen property count, the district court imposed a sentence of 140 days jail
time, with credit for 140 days served. (R., pp.179-81.)
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sentences of five years, with two years fixed. Additionally, the district court should have, rather
than retaining jurisdiction, suspended the sentences and placed Mr. Jay on probation for a period
of five years.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving “due regard
to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest.” State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Jay does not assert that his sentences exceed the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order
to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Jay must show that in light of the governing criteria, the
sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id. An appellate court, “[w]hen reviewing the length of a sentence . . .
consider[s] the defendant’s entire sentence.” State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726 (2007). The
reviewing court will “presume that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s
probable term of confinement.” Id.
Mr. Jay submits that, because the district court did not give adequate consideration to
mitigating factors, his sentences are excessive considering any view of the facts. Specifically,
the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Jay’s family situation.

Mr. Jay had a

tumultuous relationship with his girlfriend, who was his high school sweetheart and first love.
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(See PSI, p.14.) They had one child together, a son who is now about seven years old. (See PSI,
pp.14-15; Tr., p.169, Ls.4-5.)
Mr. Jay’s girlfriend died in a car accident a few months before his arrest in the instant
case. (See PSI, p.14.) Mr. Jay’s father reported the death had been hard on Mr. Jay. (PSI, p.15.)
In his written comments to the district court, Mr. Jay stated, “I would like to include that my life
turned to this direction due a recent loss of the mother to my child. I felt hopeless and was
seeking help but in the wrong places.” (PSI, p.20.)
During the presentence investigation, Mr. Jay stated, “I put all my energy into my son
since his mom passed.” (PSI, p.14.) He described himself as a “full-time father.” (PSI, p.15.)
He also stated, “I am the only thing my seven year old son has to bond to and I would like to go
back to resume that position.” (PSI, p.15.) Mr. Jay reported his father and his son’s maternal
grandparents were currently providing care for his son. (PSI, p.15.) However, Mr. Jay’s father
stated the maternal grandparents had been caring for the son, and were not allowing any contact
with him or Mr. Jay. (PSI, p.15.) Mr. Jay’s father stated Mr. Jay “would do whatever he had to
for his son.” (PSI, p.15.)
At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Jay addressed the district court: “I feel like I can do
probation, I feel like I’d be compliant. I have a 7-year-old son that his mom passed; he kind of
needs me right now. That would be a big thing to keep me sober and keep me straight.”
(Tr., p.169, Ls.3-6.) Mr. Jay also stated, “[a]nd I have my father here today to give—give me a
place to live and kind of work as a support system for me too.” (Tr., p.169, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Jay’s
father had reported he would allow Mr. Jay to move into one of his other houses near his
residence, and have Mr. Jay help out with repairs until he found employment. (See PSI, p.14.)
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Additionally, the district court did not adequately consider Mr. Jay’s problems with
substance abuse, and his desire to address those problems. The Idaho Supreme Court has
recognized substance abuse as a mitigating factor in cases where it found a sentence to be
excessive. See, e.g., State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Mr. Jay reported he started using
alcohol, cocaine, marijuana and methamphetamine when he was seventeen years old. (PSI,
p.18.) He stated cocaine and methamphetamine were his drugs of choice, and he was a daily
user prior to his current incarceration. (PSI, p.18.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Jay’s counsel
told the district court that Mr. Jay had “been sober for quite some time now, and believes that on
probation and continuing with drug treatment, that he can be successful and turn his life around.”
(Tr., p.168, Ls.12-15.) Mr. Jay informed the district court it was “no secret” that he had had a
drug problem for a large period of his life, and he had been doing his own rehabilitating through
exercise, workbooks, and other activities. (See Tr., p.168, L.22 – p.169, L.2.)
The district court also did not adequately consider Mr. Jay’s remorse and acceptance of
responsibility. During the presentence investigation, he reported he felt “unintelligent” about the
instant offenses. (See PSI, p.4.) At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Jay stated, “I’d just [like] to
apologize for the choices I’ve made.” (Tr., p.168, Ls.21-22.)
Based on the above mitigating factors, Mr. Jay asserts his sentences are excessive
considering any view of the facts. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it imposed
his concurrent unified sentences. The district court should have imposed unified sentences of
five years, with two years fixed, suspended the sentences, and placed Mr. Jay on probation for a
period of five years.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Jay respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentences
as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 19th day of April, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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